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A Survey of Views on Motor Vehicle Accident
Compensation and the Concept of Fault
MARTIN SILVER0
INT RODUCTION
Law, the governmentally enforceable rules controlling the relations of
man with his fellows, necessarily changes with the evolution of society.
Where law rules, tranquility dwells.
Throughout history legal institutions have developed to meet the
new situations. Law is a vital, changing force.
1
Industrial accident law was made over by Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts in the early part of the century.2 Ontario was a
pioneer jurisdiction in this type of legislation and now all jurisdic-
tions in North America have some sort of Workmen's Compensation
Act. Under the common law, employers careless of their employees'
safety were shielded from liability by such defences as contributory
negligence, voluntary assumption of risk and negligence of a fellow
servant. The injured who recovered inadequate damages or no
damages at all, were thrown upon the mercy of the state and charity.
The problems posed by traffic accidents today are not the same
as those of industrial accidents fifty years ago. The victims of traffic
accidents generally fare better in court than did industrial accident
victims. The same defences do not protect the injurer. For example,
in Ontario, contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar 3 though
it continues to be so in most jurisdictions in the United States.
Awards, by and large, are generally considered adequate and the
very high number of drivers with liability insurance, plus the exist-
ence of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund combine to make
some compensation generally available to most victims.
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the present system has been
expressed in recent years and the volume of adverse comment has
grown. The principal arguments in favour of a change in the law
seem to be:
*Mtr. Silver is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1Stanley F. Reed, (Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States) The Living Law, An Essay contained in Legal Institutions Today
and Tomorrow, (1959 Columbia University Press), 310.
2 Ontario passed its Workmen's Compensation Act in 1886.
3 Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 261.
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(1) that findings on issues of fault are most difficult, being
based on evidence that is often unreliable at best, and, that on the
whole, the concept of fault has been misapplied to the problem;
(2) that computation of general damages in terms of dollars
results in "jackpot" justice; and
(3) that the state must still intervene in situations where the
defendant is impecunious, has no insurance or cannot be identified.
The problem of trial delay is serious in some jurisdictions although,
it would not seem to be too significant in Ontario.
It should be noted that much of the criticism of litigation on
automobile accidents comes from the United States where the situa-
tion in most jurisdictions is far worse for the injured victim. Con-
tributory negligence, whatever the degree, is generally a good defence
and only in New York and Massachusetts are motorists compelled to
have liability insurance. Trial delays of several years are quite
common in some U.S. centres, and litigation expenses plus counsel
fees eat up as much as half the award.4 The net result is, that in
Ontario, with a very high rate of insured drivers,5 a recently enacted
Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund and the Negligence Act, the
injured victim is in a better position than in most North American
jurisdictions. But in spite of this, the law in this area does merit
examination.
THE CONCEPT OF FAULT
In Ontario, the basis of liability is fault or negligence. It is
this aspect of traffic accident law that has received the most criticism
of late. Should there be a different basis of liability? It would require
a volume rather than an article to probe deeply into the many prob-
lems presented by the concept of fault and its operation in the
courts today. Thus, unfortunately, a brief discussion will have to
suffice to demonstrate some of the major weaknesses of the concept.
There has been no serious attempt by the courts to create any
new rules of liability for automobile accidents. Yet, in other areas
of tort law, rules of strict liability have been devised.6 Early in the
process of developing doctrine applicable to motor cars, the courts
rejected the notion that drivers should bear absolute liability, and,
instead, based their reasoning on the notion that liability should be
by reference to the standard of due care under the circumstances.7
4 Zeisel, Kalven & Buchholz, Delay in Court, (Little, Brown & Co., 1959).
5 Recent computation puts the percentage of insured drivers in Ontario
at 97.4%.-Dept of Transport.
6 The law has imposed strict liability for injury caused by animals and
dangerous activities. The Dog Tax and Live Stock Protection Act, R.S.O. 1960,
c. 111; Dokuchia v. Domansch, [1945] O.R. 141 at 146, per Laidlaw J.A.: The
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was not confined to landowners but made the
owner of a dangerous thing liable for "any mischief thereby occasioned";
and it was immaterial whether damage be caused on or off defendant's
premises.
7Phillips vs. Britannia Hygenic Laundry. [1923] 1 K.B. 539, 552-3.
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It was this same theory that was generally applied to meet the
problems of injury to workmen resulting from the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Had the judges who adapted this doctrine to motor vehicle
accidents been able to visualize the congested high-speed highways
of today, one wonders whether they would have done so. However,
the law of automobile liability was made to depend on negligence
because of prevailing social interest. The fact that motoring has
increasingly become a major source of injuries over the years has
had little effect on substantive tort law.8
But the application of negligence liability to what many say is
the "inevitable result" of such activity, has deprived the negligence
test of its original meaning. The foresight of the reasonable man
has come to be applied to innocent, even involuntary, acts. If negli-
gence is the causing of foreseeable and avoidable harm, harm caused
by driving a motor vehicle is negligently caused.9 This is so, if one
accepts the premise that there will be a certain number of accidents
on the roads regardless of the normal care taken by average drivers.
But, having been permitted or even encouraged by the law, the
conduct of the defendant lacks the "immorality" required for the
imposition of liability for negligence.
The situation presents a contradiction. On the one hand, ad-
herence to the theory of liability based on fault would indicate that
moral wrongdoing ought to be punished with a resultant improvement
in the character of the wrongdoer. Yet, there appears to be a pre-
occupation with the fate of the victim, rather than with the fault
of the alleged tortfeasor, even when the entire action is cast in the
form of liability for negligence, as evidenced by the reluctance of
the courts to award exemplary damages.' 0 In such a situation, any
moral lesson for the defendant, (if there is any such lesson as the
words "negligence" and "fault" imply) tends to be lost amid a mass
of evidence dealing with the social and economic aspects of the
plight of the victim. Moreover, it is suggested that any possible
moral lesson is diluted by delay in coming to trial and is insulated
from the parties by the use of counsel.
The whole concept of liability for "fault," it is suggested, is
largely a legal fiction. In the days of horse and buggy, when acci-
dents occurred slowly and injuries were few and generally less
severe, a finding of fault was more feasible-" Now, cars move at
high speed and accidents happen very quickly, almost before anyone
8 There was at first a judicial inclination to regard cars as akin to wild
beasts: (WaZton vs. Vanguard (1908) 25 T.L.R. 13) but this was soon aban-
doned: Phillips vs. Britannia, supra, footnote 7.
9 For a complete discussion of the theory, read: A. A. Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault, (University of California Press, 1951).1 o Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless there has been such a
lack of care as to raise a presumption that the defendant realized the con-
sequences of his actions, but did not heed them. Jackson vs. C.P.R. (1915) 8
W.W.R. 1043, 1050.
11 Clarence Morris, Morris on Torts, (Foundation Press, 1953.) 342, 343.
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realizes it, and the results are often very serious. In many cases
it is virtually impossible to determine who was at fault or how to
apportion blame. The distribution of negligence between plaintiff
and defendant means very little except that the plaintiff will have
that much deducted from his damages.12
But, the doctrine of negligence would be equally unfair to the
defendant if the plaintiff did not have to prove fault. Suppose, for
example, the onus was entirely shifted to the defendant to disprove
his negligence once the plaintiff established that he had been injured
as a result of the defendant's actions. As long as fault is the basis
of liability, the burden of disproving it would be as great at that of
proving it, perhaps greater. In either case there would be unfairness,
except that in the latter the plaintiff would have a prima facie case
on proof of injury, as in pedestrian accidents now. Such a step would
benefit plaintiffs greatly, but would not reduce the problems of litiga-
tion based on proof of fault.
Could these difficulties be removed by the adoption of absolute
liability? Perhaps so, but would absolute liability be justified? If the
injurer were truly innocent, why should he bear the loss rather than
the victim himself, or any equally innocent third party, such as
the owner of the vehicle? The only logical answer would be to base
the injurer's liability on the fact that he is better able to bear the
loss. This would mean that insurability rather than causation should
be the test. If so, does it matter what form of insurance the injurer
carries, liability for negligence or an accident policy compensating
the injured regardless of fault.
It has been suggested that the "foreseeability" test is meaning-
less in most accident situations as a test of negligence. However, if
related to the activity per se rather than to the immediate causative
conduct, it again becomes meaningful. In other words, the test of
individual foreseeability should be replaced by a test of general possi-
bility or "typicality".' 3 This change in emphasis, though not adopted
by the courts, would seem to express the missing rationale of a
negligence liability for enterprise. A clue can perhaps be gained
by examining the liability for breach of contract, which can be, and
often has been, invoked to obtain strict liability in the absence of a
tort rule to that effect.' 4
12The basic premise of this part of the essay is that the fault doctrine
has, at best, been improperly applied and the Negligence Act complicates
matters. There seems to be the idea amongst practicing lawyers that juries
tend to increase general damages to compensate for the distribution of neg-
ligence thus negating the purpose of the Negligence Act.13 Negligence Without Fault, supra, footnote 9 at p. 50. This "typicality"
test, unlike the general "foreseeability" test of the fault doctrine, delimits
the liability for hazardous lawful activities as "one of the necessary burdens
and expenses incidental to such activities".
14 Lockett v. har7es [19381 4 All E.R. 170.
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The rule of the classic case of Hadley v. BaxendaZe'5 is that
damages for breach of contract are "such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach
of it." This rule, by relating the foreseeability test to the time of the
making of the contract, rather than to the time of its breach, may
be the way out of this problem in tort law. The rule, by thus limiting
liability, on the one hand shows a policy of encouraging enterprise
by reducing the extent of risk, and on the other, imposes liability
for harm foreseeable as possible at the time of the start of the
activity, whether or not that harm was foreseeable at the time of
the causation of the particular harm.
At present, the contract rule can be directly applied to tort
situations only where the law recognizes strict liability, i.e., ultra-
hazardous activity.' 6 Here, the contemplation test may be related to
a constructive "contract" between the actor and society, under which
the enterprise is allowed in spite of the known danger, in considera-
tion of the assumption of full liability for those, and only those,
damages which "may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time when they made the
contract." Causing such harm would be considered as bringing this
"contractual" liability into operation whether or not the harmful
event was preceded by "fault".
The contractual contemplation test in analogy to Hadley vs.
Baxendae is distinct from the traditional foreseeability test and
similar to the typical tests of strict liability. Note in the Restatement,
the basis of liability for ultrahazardous activity: Anticipation of
harm at the time of the start of the activity rather than at the
time of the injurious conduct determines the scope of liability.17 It
might be said that this basis of liability is the price which must be
paid to society for the permission of a "hazardous" activity.
Basically, the problem to be faced is with the current attitude
toward the use of automobiles. Because cars are so commonly and
widely used there seems to be a general reluctance to consider the
activity any more hazardous than other "usual" or "normal"
activities.1s
The psychological factors involved in driving are important
when the causes of accidents are studied. The psychology of driving
has a relationship to the traffic laws since the laws function as the
framework by which the driver gives order to the various objects
which he perceives and must deal with as he moves down the road
in his car. Enough is known about the process of driving to say that
15 Hadley vs. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341.
36 Read vs. Lyons [1947) A.C. 156. Rylands vs. Fletchter (1868) L.R. 3 H.L.
330.17 See: American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, sec. 519.
18 Fleming, The Law of Torts, (2d ed.), 282.
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it is not a series of entirely reflex actions. But, on the other hand,
it is not such a complex operation as to require the constant
attention of the highest levels of conscious thought.19
The behaviour characteristics of driving would seem to be
difficult to reach by the procedures customarily employed in litigation.
Such behaviour rarely has any of the "intent" which is an essential
element of crime, and is deemed to lack the legal element of deliberate
calculation which is involved in most situations where "risks" are
taken. Yet, most accidents are caused, not by negligence in this
strict sense of the word, but by a faulty psychological reaction built
into the makeup of the driver. Some studies indicate that a relatively
small percentage of drivers are responsible for a disproportionately
large number of accidents. These are the "accident prone".2
All this would indicate that there are many factors influencing
accidents other than negligence and mechanical breakdown. Only in
some cases is fault the sole factor in producing an accident The
studies on accident proneness and the psychological factors influenc-
ing the use of automobiles do not show a great deal yet, except that
there might be less of an argument in favour of the fault doctrine
than in the past. If a certain number of accidents are to be con-
sidered the inevitable price society must pay for the general use
of motor cars, does the fault doctrine really fit into such a scheme?
SOLUTIONS
How then, is the problem to be met? If we do impose on auto-
mobile drivers the tests of liability that a "dangerous" activity merits,
then insurance will become more expensive in the cost of automobile
operation. It has been suggested that no matter what is done or
not done, the cost of automobile accidents will not change; however,
the cost will be allocated differently. This then, is really the crux
of the problem. It must be decided whether we are able to alter
more fairly the distribution of the costs of the social phenomenon
knowri as the automobile. It is in this matter that one most hears
emotional and political arguments in favour of or against any
modification of the law. In order to visualize the effect of any
future change, we require a detailed study of the present law in order
to know its social and financial impact on the people involved, both
injured and injurer. What is the influence of the medical care and
hospitalization plans and the various income protection plans? All
of these social insurance schemes bear on this problem and the
19 R. D. Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differing Types of Liability
Legislation, 15 Ohio St. L.J. 110, 114 (1954).
20 For discussions of accident proneness and the psychology of driving,
some articles are: VanLennap, Psychological Factors in Driving, 6 Traffic
Quarterly 483 (1952). Stack, What Makes Drivers Act That Way?, 1 Traffic
Quarterly 29 (1947). James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950). Accident Proneness (1951) 115 Just. P.
290, 614. McNeice & Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Com-
pensation, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 585 (1952).
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whole field deserves special study before any drastic changes are
attempted.2 '
The impact of liability insurance deserves special attention. If
liability were not insurable, the courts would never have been able
to extend this liability to cover those actions called negligent, but
which involve no moral fault. It has been suggested that automobile
liability insurance ultimately owes its legality to the desire to
protect the victim rather than the insured.22 If so, such insurance is
lawful only because it covers, primarily, accidents caused by insured
drivers without moral fault. On the other hand, it is the availability
of this insurance that will induce courts and juries to give verdicts
against "blameless" defendants. The uninsured will be treated as if
insured, and the insured will be held liable without regard to the
amount of coverage.
It would seem then, that the present form of insurance,, for the
sake of the victim, tends to cover both guilty and innocent alike. For
this reason, it could be considered a threat to highway safety and
the promotion of care that has been stressed in defending the present
system.
There have been various suggestions in recent years in the
form of concrete proposals for the modification of the common law.
It is my intention to briefly describe some of the more important
ones.
THE SASKATCHEWAN SOLUTION
This plan, in operation since 1946, is based on the recommenda-
tions contained in the Columbia Report of 193223 and operates some-
what like Workmen's Compensation. The Act provides that "every
person is hereby insured" against loss resulting from bodily injury
sustained in an accident while driving or riding in a moving motor
vehicle in Saskatchewan, or as a result of a collision with or being
run over by a motor vehicle, regardless of fault.24 The insurance
protects not only the person named in the issued certificate, but
any other person in Saskatchewan riding in the vehicle while it is
being operated by a properly licensed driver. Any person injured who
is not named as an insured is also "deemed to be a party to the
contract and to have given consideration therefor" and is protected.
The insurance itself protects all persons domiciled in Saskatchewan
injured while driving or riding in a vehicle outside Saskatchewan
21 For the type of studies indicated, see: Morris & Paul, The Financial
Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. of Penn. L.R. 913 (1962). Franklin,
Chanin and Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics
of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1961). Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961).22A. A. Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 L. &
Cont. Prob. 445, (1950).23 Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents to Columbia University, Council for Research in the Social Sciences
(1932).24 Automobile Accident Insurance Act, R.S.S. 1953, c. 371, s. 19(1).
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anywhere on the North American "continent.25 Coverage is secured
under an exclusive provincial insurance fund and payment is con-
current with applications for renewal of licenses and registrations.
Briefly, the benefits provided under the plan are:
(1) personal injury coverage;
(2) compensation for impairment of bodily functions;
(3) supplementary allowance;
(4) weekly indemnity;
(5) third party liability coverage; and
(6) comprehensive coverage.
Personal injury benefits range up to a maximum of $10,000
for any one death, the amount payable depending on the category
and age of the victim and the extent of his injury and length of
disability.26 Permanent impairment of bodily function is compen-
sated under a schedule with a maximum of $4,000 allowed.27 A sup-
plementary allowance, previously payable in varying sums up to
$2,000 for incidental medical costs is now largely covered by the
recently adopted medical care plan.28 A weekly indemnity is payable
during periods of incapacity up to 104 weeks.29 In addition, the
plan has comprehensive coverage with a $200 deductible clause.30
Since the Saskatchewan plan does not eliminate an injured per-
son's common law rights, the insurance includes third party liability
coverage up to $10,000 per person, $20,000 per accident and $5,000
for property damage3 1 This may be supplemented by additional
liability insurance. If a victim sues at common law, and damages are
awarded, sums that have been paid to him under the compensation
plan are deducted. Thus, the Act remains a compensation scheme
supplementing the common law remedies of the victim.
A study of the Act reveals that the benefits payable appear to
be rather low, but it is to be noted that the premiums are also low.3 2
25 Ibid., s. 19(2).
26 bid., Part II Coverage, ss. 22 and 23.
27 Ibid., s. 20.
28 Ibid., s. 22(1).
29 Ibid., s. 21(1).
30 Ibid., Part lI Coverage s. 33.
31 Tbid., Part IV Coverage s. 37 et seq.
32 In 1960, the rates on private passenger vehicles were fixed as follows:
Wheelbase Wheelbase Wheelbase
Under 100" 100"-120" over 120"
Year Model prior to and incl. 1948 .................. $ 5 $ 5 $ 5
1949 and 1950 . . ...... 7 12 12
1951 and 1952 ............. 9 15 15
1953 and 1954 ................. ......................... ............ 15 20 25
1955 and 1956 .............................................................................. 20 25 30
1957 and later ......... 30 35 40
Also, a premium of $2.00 is payable on each operator's permit. The insur-
ance rate is increased for motorists with bad driving records. There is a
[FooTNoT CONTINUED oN NEXT PAGE].
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In any event, a person dissatisfied with the compensation given him,
is free to pursue his common law remedies 33 in court on the basis of
negligence as in Ontario. As this scheme is at present the only one
in actual operation in this field, most of the criticism of any sort of
modification of the law is aimed at this plan. However, there have
been other concrete proposals.
THE EHRENZWEIG PLAN
One of the most intricate and original plans was offered by Pro-
fessor Albert A. Ehrenzweig of California in his book, FuZZ Aid In-
surance for the Traffic Victim.34 The plan develops in three steps.
The first would be a new form of insurance, "full aid" insurance,
providing compensation for victims on strict liability in certain min-
imum amounts, based on the type of injury suffered.3 Any driver
or owner carrying such insurance would be relieved, by statute, of
any common law civil liability based on negligence. The statute
would not relieve anyone for criminal liability. Thus, where a person
was criminally negligent, common law liability would remain. The
insurance would not be compulsory and the ordinary form of liability
insurance would also be available.
The second step of this plan involves the creation of a fund for
uncompensated injuries where the injurer has no insurance and is
insolvent. The fund would be administered by the insurance companies
from which the victim of such an accident could recover the same
amounts as if the injurer had "full aid" insurance. This fund would be
financed partly by taxation and partly by fines levied against persons
guilty of traffic violations. 3
6
rate appeals board established to hear appeals on the insurer's rate. By
section 5 of the Act, the rates are fixed by regulation, promulgated by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council.
Compensation for impairment of bodily function is by schedule, part of
the schedule being as follows:
For loss of:
Both hands by severance at or above the wrists ...................... ...... $4,000
Both feet by severance at or above the ankles .. ............... 4,000
One hand at or above the wrist and one foot at or above the ankle, by
severance ........ ...... ................................. .............................................. ......... 4,000
Entire sight of both eyes, if irrecoverably lost ............................................................... 4,000
Entire sight of one eye, if irrecoverably lost, and one hand at or above.
the w rist by severance .............................................................................................................. 4,000
One arm by. severance at or above the elbow ...................................................... 2,700
One leg by severance at or above the knee .......... .... ..... ............. 2,700
Either hand by severance at or above the wrist ........................-.......................... :... 2,000
Entire sight of one eye, if irrecoverably lost ... .......................... . . ...... . . .............. 2,000
Thumb and index finger of either hand at or above the metacarpo-
phalangeal joints ...................................................................... . . ........................................ 1,000
Thumb of either hand at or above the metacarpo-phalangeal joints 500
These amounts are set by section 20.33.As well as this right, the right of action against the Saskatchewan
Government Insurance Office to recover benefits lawfully due to an insured
is expressly provided by section 45.
34 A. A. Ehrenzweig, Full Aid Insurance For the Traffic Victim, University
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The third step consists of the fines to be levied against both
drivers and victims who are truly negligent.37 Thus, the deterrent
aspect of civil liability based on fault would be replaced by "tort fines"
which would be measured by the gravity of the defendant's fault
and his financial circumstances, rather than by the extent of the
harm done.
Professor Ehrenzweig claims that his plan would achieve the
following:
(1) insurance will remain voluntary;
(2) there would be no diminution of safety incentives and prob-
ably an increase in them;
(3) common law rights would be retained against those not
having "full aid" insurance;
(4) costs of premiums, while unpredictable without detailed
actuarial study, would seem to be comparable to the present U.S.
system, due to savings in the costs of adjustment and litigation;
(5) there would be easy calculation of awards based on schedules
related to the injuries suffered, much like the Saskatchewan Plan; and
(6) there would be the widest possible coverage of the public.3 S
Will the plan work as claimed? It would provide recovery for
all auto accident victims, since every victim will be the beneficiary
of either the "full aid" insurance or regular liability insurance; and
if these fail, the victim can claim from the fund. If the plan does
work, it will substantially reduce the cost of litigation and processing
claims. Although Professor Ehrenzweig freely admits that "the
facts and figures [are] yet to be gathered and studied," it can be
argued with some force that the cost of premiums under his plan
will be less than the cost of liability insurance. In fact, if the plan
is to be voluntary, they must be less if the plan is to work.
While space does not allow a thorough analysis of the plan,
there are certain flaws which seem clear. For example, drivers will
be reluctant to exchange their liability insurance, which protects
them from all forms of negligence, for his "full-aid" insurance,
which seems to leave them still civilly liable if "criminally negligent."
To get around this, Professor Ehrenzweig would use statutory induce-
ments to promote the use of "full-aid" insurance. 39
THE GREEN PROPOSAL
A more recent suggestion rejecting the Workmen's Compensa-
tion analogy is that of Dean Leon Green in the 1958 Rosenthal Lec-
tures at Northwestern University School of Law, under the title
37 Ibid., 33.
38 Ibid., 31-40, inclusive.
3 9 For example, Professor Ehrenzweig would make "full aid" insurance
compulsory after one accident.
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Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Inswrance.40 Dean Green claims that
"the courts are powerless to reconstruct a rational process for general
use. They have reached a dead end. As a means of giving adequate
protection against the machines of the highway, negligence law has
run its course. Something better must be found."41
Dean Green presents an outline of a plan almost radical in its
simplicity. His scheme has three basic provisions:
(1) compulsory insurance of motor vehicles;
(2) the insurance to be an accident policy which inures to the
benefit of anyone injured by the vehicle; and
(3) damages are to be measured as at common law, except that
pain and suffering would not be grounds of recovery.42
In the choice between what he considers adequate damages and
the burden of higher premiums, Dean Green comes out in favour of
adequate awards. In the matter of deterrence, he places reliance on
strict enforcement of traffic laws.
These, then, are some of the more wide sweeping changes that
have been suggested. But, minor changes that would contribute to
a smoother operation of the present Ontario law have been put
forward.
LAW SOCIETY SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE TRIAL OF
DAMAGE ACTIONS SUBMISSION 43
A Special Committee made up of prominent Ontario lawyers
appointed by the Law Society favours maintenance of the present
system with regard to the retention of the fault concept. Their report
took the position that litigation as a means of obtaining compensation
is used only in a very small percentage of cases and that most are
settled fairly, without undue delay.44 However, the Committee did
suggest that there was room for improvements. Among these would be:
(1) the abolition of the "gratuitous passenger" section of the
Highway Traffic Act, sec. 105 (2),45
40 Leon Green, Traff Victims: Tort Law and Insurance (Northwestern
University Press, 1958).
41 Ibid., 82.
4 2 Ibid, c. 4.
43 Submission to The Select Committee of the Legislature on the Present
System of Compensating Automobile Accident Victims in Ontario, with
Possible Improvements, and an Examination of the Proposed Establishment
of an Automobile Accident Commission to Compensate Automobile Accident
Victims Without Regard to Fault; Prepared by a Special Committee on the
Trial of Damage Actions Appointed by Convocation of the Benchers of the
Law Society of Upper Canada. Terence Sheard, Q.C., Chairman; Edson L.
Haines, Q.C., W. S. Martin, Q.C., Brendan O'Brien, Q.C., Ralph D. Steele,
Q.C., R. F. Wilson Q.C.
44 The Committee claims 98% of claims are never brought before a Court
in any way (p. 7) and that of the 2% which do involve legal action, 90% are
settled without completing trial (p. 11). If this is so, then only 1 in 500
accidents go to final judgment in court.
45 I S.O. 1960, c. 172; ibid, 12.
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(2) the provision of limited accident benefits in liability policies
for people injured but who cannot obtain damages due to the operation
of the fault doctrine;46
(3) making the owner of the vehicle responsible for its mechani-
cal condition, so that the defence of unavoidable accident is not
available; 47
(4) making the operator responsible for his physical or mental
condition;48 and
(5) the abolition of the insurer's defence of breach of statutory
condition.4
9
It is respectfully submitted that in conceding the possibility of
limited accident benefits, the Committee has demonstrated that
some changes are needed. Whether they be limited or more wide-
sweeping is a policy decision on questions of need and financing, based
on a study of the workings of the present system.
OBJECTIONS TO "STRICT LIABILITY"
Safety
The main criticism of any principle of liability, other than one
based on negligence, seems to be that it would not encourage due
care and caution in driving. This is apparently based on the idea
of deterrence, that people are careful because they know they may
be personally liable in the event of an accident. Psychological studies
in this area are inconclusive as yet, but certainly seem to indicate
that this thought rarely enters a driver's mind.50 The mental pro-
cesses behind accident-proneness are not well understood, but it
would be safe to assume that no one would allow himself, or another,
to be injured because he knew there would be compensation. The
experience with Workmen's Compensation would seem to indicate this,
as does the fact that in recent years the percentage of insured drivers
in Ontario has increased to very high levels, yet there has been no
alarming increase in the rate of auto accidents.51 People are protect-





50 Netherton, supra, footnote 19 at 118.








It might be safe to assume that more accidents were reported as more
people carried liability insurance. Note also the fact that the estimated
mileage driven has also increased.
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Also, as mentioned earlier, if this objection was valid; the
existence of liability insurance would have the same effect on the
attitude of drivers to the safety of other road users, as would any
sort of compensation plan.
Socialism
The objection that any state sponsored scheme is a step along
the road to socialism or the "service state" may or may not be valid.
It is suggested that it is of the same validity as the arguments
against Workmen's Compensation, and other social welfare legisla-
tion. Such objections are political and not legal in nature.
Accident Compensation in General
Others declare that automobile accidents are but a small portion
of all personal injury accidents, and that if the state is going to
engage in or encourage any sort of compensation plan for automobile
accident victims, why not for the victims of all accidents, such as
a fall in the bathtub. The answer to this is that, the fall at home is
an isolated event and is not in itself a social problem (although acci-
dents in general may well be). The fall in the tub is not the product
of a fast moving society, which injures thousands in the same way.
The automobile accident victim is a social problem because of his
numbers and the common source of his injuries.
Cost
A very important objection is the cost of any such project. As
stated earlier, without careful study, the premiums for any new
insurance scheme cannot be determined. However, it is submitted
that overall costs would not be increased, but only distributed differ-
ently. At present, the victim who cannot recover damages must
either bear the cost of his injury himself or claim from the govern-
ment sponsored Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund. A further
point is the fact that at the present time about one third of all
premiums collected for private passenger automobile liability insur-
ance goes for administration costs. 52 In Saskatchewan, 82% of pre-
miums collected are available to pay claims. Any plan reducing the
costs of litigation, adjustment and administration would free money
for actual benefits.
Benefits by Schedule
Perhaps, the most fundamental objection is to benefits according
to a fixed schedule. This is based on the belief that it is unfair to
52 Automobile Experience, prepared by the Statistical Agency of the
Canadian Underwriter's Association under orders from the Superintendent
of Insurance, p. 5.
In Ontario, the associated companies collected, for private passenger
vehicle liability insurance, premiums totalling $50,831,572 and paid out approxi-
mately $33,000,000 in benefits, including costs of litigation. This was for
the period January, 1960 to June 1961, inc. For the Saskatchewan costs, see
1962 Consumer Reports 352.
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compensate on the basis of the extent of the injury, rather than on
the basis of the loss incurred due to the injury. The answer to this
objection is most difficult and would depend to what degree the
costs of the plan are to be distributed amongst drivers of motor cars.
At one end of the scale is the plan of Dean Green, which would retain
common law damages, save for pain and suffering. Without question,
the costs of premiums to the individual driver would be very high
as compared to the present cost of liability insurance, but, whether
or not it would be prohibitive remains to be seen in the light of
study and experience. Only estimates can be made at present.
At the opposite end of the scale is the Saskatchewan solution.
This scheme has a fixed schedule of benefits depending on the type
of injury. To many, the benefits seem intolerably low. This deficiency
could be overcome by the actuarial computation of schedules tailored
to various activities. This would increase premium costs somewhat,
but would be a compromise between the rigours of the present Sas-
katchewan plan and the high costs of the Green proposal. However,
the individual who wishes to give himself additional protection
could purchase an accident insurance policy. In any case, the person
with special interests to protect needs protection from a large number
and variety of human and natural sources of harm, and self insuring
is thus both necessary and reasonable. 53 If such a plan were to be
adopted in Ontario, the schedule of benefits could be made high
enough to suit Ontario standards.
The Right to Bring Action
As has been indicated, any scheme could retain a victim's com-
mon law rights based on negligence. The Saskatchewan solution
does not seek to do absolute justice to a victim, but only to allow
him average justice, at low cost and with no delay.5 -
Administration
The problems of administration of any such plan should not
be a valid objection. While there may be lack of exact precedent,
the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act in Ontario is a
valuable precedent for the operation of any plan in which the govern-
ment might participate.
Conclusion
-The fact that persons who cause their own injury would be
compensated is true. But, it must be remembered that there is a
gulf between causation and fault At present, the fault or negligence
of the defendant, alleged by the plaintiff, may consist of no more
than a technically faulty reaction, often committed in the instant
before collision. The courts have met this problem by recognizing
530. E. Lang, The Activity-Risk Theory of Tort: Risk, Insurance and
Insolvency, (1961), 39 Can. Bar Rev. 530, 540.
541M., C. Shumiatcher, State Compulsory Insurance Act (1961), 39 Can. Bar
Rev 107,' 115.
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"negligence without fault"51 as a basis of compensation. By expanding
the concept of "legal" fault, the present law has altered the concept
of "moral" fault and yet has denied relief to many. If the injurer
was "innocent", the injured must bear his own loss. The insistence
of the law in basing liability on negligence-in other words, the
use of a "fault" rationale for what is often non-faulty behaviour-
has seriously affected the operation of the law.
One way to solve the problem is to attack its crux, that is, the
law's inability to transform a set of quasi-criminal tort rules ad-
monishing a "wrong-doer", 56 into a tool for distributing losses inevita-
bly caused by the hazards of our mechanical age.
5 7
The existence of a fringe element of drivers that might "take
advantage of" any plan is all the more reason for implementation of
such a plan. Anyone could be a victim. The essence of the arguments
against any such plan is against insurance for ourselves, whether as
beneficiaries directly, or as those who must bear the ultimate loss
of such accidents.
55 Negligence Without Fault, supra, footnote 9 at 39.
56 Fleming, supra, footnote 18 at 282.
"The over-all effect of these various techniques, devices and subterfuges
is that the 'expressed doctrines' of the law no longer furnish an accurate
reflection of the real law in operation. It is increasingly being realized
that a certain spate of accidents is the inevitable price of the modern
machine age, and that a reduction of the toll cannot be hoped for through
the deterrent operation of tort law. Hence, the fault concept Is losing
much of its erstwhile importance, both as regards defendants in the manner
already described and as regards plaintiffs, by partly eliminating, and partly
tempering, the defences of contributory negligence and voluntary assump-
tion of risk. Accident prevention, particularly on the road and In factories,
is more effectively promoted by the deterrent effect of penal sanctions in
cases of gross transgressions, or the educative pressures of road safety
campaigns and demands by trade unions and insurance companies for
safer working conditions in industry. This leaves to the law of torts in-
creasingly the primary function of compensating victims of the 'typical'
accidents of modern society and ensuring wide distribution of losses among
those sections of the community which participate in or profit from the
risk-creating activity. The most effective device for transforming tort law
from its one-time admonitory to its new compensatory and loss-distributive
purpose is to encourage the encroachment of strict liability and Its ultimate
displacement of our existing accident law based on the outmoded rules of
negligence."
57 C. Morris, Bough Justice and Borne Utopian Ideas, (1930) 24 IlL L.
Rev. 730, 733:
"The attempt is to compensate the plaintiff for one set of reasons, and
to punish the defendant for an entirely different set of reasons, by the
single act of making the defendant pay a sum of money to the plaintiff."
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